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Abstract
Background: The Basic Formal Ontology (BFO) is a top-level formal foundational ontology for the biomedical domain. It has
been developed with the purpose to serve as an ontologically consistent template for top-level categories of application
oriented and domain reference ontologies within the Open Biological and Biomedical Ontologies Foundry (OBO). BFO is
important for enabling OBO ontologies to facilitate in reliably communicating and managing data and metadata within and
across biomedical databases. Following its intended single inheritance policy, BFO’s three top-level categories of material
entity (i.e. ‘object’, ‘fiat object part’, ‘object aggregate’) must be exhaustive and mutually disjoint. We have shown elsewhere
that for accommodating all types of constitutively organized material entities, BFO must be extended by additional
categories of material entity.
Methodology/Principal Findings: Unfortunately, most biomedical material entities are cumulative-constitutively organized.
We show that even the extended BFO does not exhaustively cover cumulative-constitutively organized material entities. We
provide examples from biology and everyday life that demonstrate the necessity for ‘portion of matter’ as another material
building block. This implies the necessity for further extending BFO by ‘portion of matter’ as well as three additional
categories that possess portions of matter as aggregate components. These extensions are necessary if the basic
assumption that all parts that share the same granularity level exhaustively sum to the whole should also apply to
cumulative-constitutively organized material entities. By suggesting a notion of granular representation we provide a way to
maintain the single inheritance principle when dealing with cumulative-constitutively organized material entities.
Conclusions/Significance: We suggest to extend BFO to incorporate additional categories of material entity and to
rearrange its top-level material entity taxonomy. With these additions and the notion of granular representation, BFO would
exhaustively cover all top-level types of material entities that application oriented ontologies may use as templates, while
still maintaining the single inheritance principle.
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Introduction
The importance of databases in biomedical sciences constantly
increases and with it the importance of organizing and stan-
dardizing their contents. Bio-ontologies play an important role in
this standardization process (e.g. [1–4]), because they can provide
controlled vocabularies with explicit definitions and unambiguous
designations in a highly formalized syntax and a standardized
format (e.g. web ontology language, OWL). This provides a
framework for an extensible data organization. As a consequence,
the interest in bio-ontology research increased significantly within
the last decade.
Many ontologies are developed with a specific application in
mind. Such terminology-based application ontologies [5,6], like the
Gene Ontology (GO) or the Systematized Nomenclature of
Medicine-Clinical Terms (SNOMED-CT), aim to provide a
system of terms (i.e. controlled vocabulary), which meets parti-
cular purposes and needs of a specific research discipline. As a
consequence, respective developers often focus exclusively on
definitions of very specific types of entities, and not much attention
is paid to top-level categories of the ontology. This can lead to
ontological inconsistencies within the ontology and incompatibil-
ities with other ontologies, which, at its turn, would also affect the
comparability and compatibility of the contents of databases that
use these ontologies. Domain reference ontologies [5,6], like the
Foundational Model of Anatomy (FMA), represent general-
purpose resources that are developed to support a range of
different types of research for a specific domain. They have the
potential to provide a template of top-level categories for
application ontologies of their domain, resulting in an increased
comparability and compatibility of respective application ontolo-
gies. However, domain reference ontologies cannot provide such a
standard across domains. This is the purpose of formal top-level
ontologies [5,6], as for instance the Descriptive Ontology for
Linguistic and Cognitive Engineering (DOLCE) or the Basic
Formal Ontology (BFO), which provide domain-independent
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most general terms and concepts. The idea is that if domain
reference ontologies make use of the machinery of a formal top-
level ontology and apply its structure to their specific domain of
reality, the comparability and compatibility across different
domain reference ontologies will increase (e.g. [6–9]). Therefore,
formal top-level ontologies take in a central role in the stan-
dardization of ontologies and thus in the standardization of
scientific database contents.
The Open Biological and Biomedical Ontologies Foundry
(OBO; http://www.obofoundry.org) provides a central platform
that facilitates in standardizing ontologies and in establishing best
practices in ontology development for the biomedical domain. It
represents one of the most important resources and repositories for
biomedical ontologies. Within the OBO Foundry, the Basic
Formal Ontology (BFO; http://www.ifomis.org/bfo; [10]), which
has been developed as a realist ontology (i.e. representing kinds of
entities and their divisions that exist in the mind-independent
world), serves as a formal top-level ontology. It provides the top-
level hierarchical structure that serves as a template for the
development of various application and domain reference
ontologies within the OBO Foundry. In other words, for all
accepted ontologies of the OBO Foundry applies that cross-
ontological comparability of application and domain reference
ontologies depends on BFO.
An increasing number of ontologies are being developed that
use BFO for their top-level framework (http://www.ifomis.org/
bfo/users). Because it has been developed with the primary
intention to be used in the structuring of biomedical domain
ontologies [11], it does not contain physical, chemical, biological,
medical or other terms that properly fall within these special
science domains. These terms must be defined in the respective
domain reference ontologies.
One of the important design principles that has been used for
developing BFO is the single inheritance policy, which requires all
defined categories to be disjoint and exhaustive – categories must
be mutually exclusive relative to a given level of granularity [11].
As a consequence, each BFO category has exactly one single
asserted parent class (except for the root category). Single
inheritance represents an important design principle because
multiple inheritance often goes hand in hand with errors in
ontology construction (e.g. [12]) and often substantially compli-
cates or even prohibits coherent integration across ontologies (e.g.
[13]). Single inheritance, on the other hand, supports clear
statements of definitions, easier and more reliable ontology
curation, and it allows the use of more powerful reasoning tools
and a single measure of distance between two classes (e.g. [14]).
From the application of the single inheritance principle to the
three different sub-categories of material entity that BFO
distinguishes follows that any given particular material entity must
instantiate exactly one of the following three types of material
entity for any given level of granularity: ‘fiat object part’, ‘object’,
or ‘object aggregate’ (for definitions see Table 1). In other words,
whereas a given material entity, as for instance an individual
human being, is an object at one level of granularity (e.g. human
body), it may at the same time be an object aggregate at a finer
level of granularity (e.g. the aggregate of all cells of the individual
human being), so that it cannot be both at a given level of
granularity. Therefore, if BFO wants to live up to its role as the
provider of a formal top-level ontology for scientific biomedical
ontologies, its top-level categories of material entity must be
exhaustive and mutually disjoint within the same level of
granularity.
In the following we focus on top-level categories of material
entity and their spatio-structural properties. We systematically
evaluate and assess whether BFO’s three categories of material
entity really exhaustively cover all types of material entity that are
relevant to the biomedical domain. Elsewhere we have already
shown that this is not the case for constitutively organized material
entities and we suggested extending BFO by adding further top-
level categories of material entity [4]. These necessary extensions
to BFO are briefly summarized in the first part of this paper. In
the second part we evaluate and assess whether this extended
BFO also exhaustively covers all types of cumulative-constitutively
organized material entities. This is important insofar, as most
biomedical material entities are cumulative-constitutively orga-
nized. By referring to adequate examples from biology we
demonstrate the necessity of further extending BFO with
additional top-level categories, which we introduce and discuss.
We argue that this extension is necessary if the basic assumption
that all parts sharing the same granularity level exhaustively sum
to the whole should also apply to cumulative-constitutively
organized material entities. By suggesting a notion of granular
representation we provide a way to maintain the single inheritance
principle also when dealing with cumulative-constitutively orga-
nized material entities. We conclude by making suggestions for
Table 1. Definitions of the Basic Types of Material Entity of the Basic Formal Ontology (BFO Version 1.1).
Definition
Parent Class
Affiliation Link/ID
‘material entity’: ‘‘An independent continuant that is spatially extended whose identity is independent of
that of other entities and can be maintained through time. Note: Material entity subsumes object, fiat object
part, and object aggregate, which assume a three level theory of granularity, which is inadequate for some
domains, such as biology. Examples: collection of random bacteria, a chair, dorsal surface of the body’’
‘independent
continuant’
http://www.ifomis.org/bfo/1.1/
snap#MaterialEntity
‘object’: ‘‘A material entity that is spatially extended, maximally self-connected and self-contained (the
parts of a substance are not separated from each other by spatial gaps) and possesses an internal unity. The
identity of substantial object entities is independent of that of other entities and can be maintained through
time. Examples: an organism, a heart, a chair, a lung, an apple’’
‘material entity’ http://www.ifomis.org/bfo/1.1/
snap#Object
‘fiat object part’: ‘‘A material entity that is part of an object but is not demarcated by any physical
discontinuities. Examples: upper and lower lobes of the left lung, the dorsal and ventral surfaces of the body,
the east side of Saarbruecken, the lower right portion of a human torso’’
‘material entity’ http://www.ifomis.org/bfo/1.1/
snap#FiatObjectPart
‘object aggregate’: ‘‘A material entity that is a mereological sum of separate object entities and
possesses non-connected boundaries. Examples: a heap of stones, a group of commuters on the subway,
a collection of random bacteria, a flock of geese, the patients in a hospital’’
‘material entity’ http://www.ifomis.org/bfo/1.1/
snap#ObjectAggregate
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0030004.t001
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can be best subsumed under a top-level taxonomy that accom-
modates all types of constitutively and cumulative-constitutively
organized material entities.
Results
Top-Level Categories of Constitutively Organized
Material Entities
Constitutive Granularity. According to BFO’s definitions of
‘object aggregate’ and ‘fiat object part’, an object aggregate
consists of objects and an object consists of fiat object parts. This
implies a very simple granularity scheme consisting of three levels
of granularity (in the following we use ‘,’ to indicate part-of or
lower-level-than relationships of a very general notion of
granularity that is based on proper direct parthood relations): fiat
object part,object,object aggregate.
This very simple scheme represents, of course, an oversimpli-
fication of reality. The scheme becomes more realistic and also
more complicated when allowing for a more complex organization
of reality, with objects of finer levels of granularity constituting
objects at coarser levels. Like for instance atoms constituting a
molecule and molecules constituting a cell. In other words,
aggregates of objects of a finer level of granularity constitute bona
fide objects at coarser granularity, resulting in a constitutive
hierarchical organization of bona fide objects of different granularity
that are nested within one another (see Fig. 1) (for constitutive
hierarchy see [15,16]).
Most granularity schemes suggested in the literature so far
presuppose such a constitutive organization of material entities
(e.g. [17,18] for an exception see [19]). They assume that: higher
level entities consist of physically joined elements, all objects
belonging to one level of granularity form parts of objects of the
next higher level of granularity, summing together all objects that
belong to one level of granularity yields a maximal bona fide object
– all parts that share the same granularity level exhaustively sum to
the whole (e.g., the sum of all cells of a human body yields the
human body as a whole).
Constitutive organization results in a granularity scheme
consisting of several blocks of the simple three-leveled granularity
scheme described above. Each block forms a level of granularity
that consists of three sublevels. Each distinguishable level of
granularity of bona fide objects has an associated level of fiat ob-
ject parts and an associated level of object aggregates (each block
demarcated by square brackets): [fiat atom part,atom,atom aggregate]
,[fiat molecule part,molecule,molecule aggregate],[fiat cell part,cell
,cell aggregate],[fiat organ part,organ,organ aggregate],[fiat body
part,body,body aggregate].
The granularity relations within each three-leveled block and
those between different bona fide object levels can be determined
universally. Determining the other granularity relations, as for
instance between atom aggregates and fiat molecule parts, is not
that straight forward and must be decided on a case by case basis
(see [4,19]).
Implications from a Constitutive Granularity: Cross-
Granular Multiple Instantiations and the Single Inherit-
ance Principle. According to the single inheritance principle, any
particular entity belongs to only one of BFO’s basic categories of
material entity: it is either an object aggregate, an object, or a fiat
object part, and it cannot instantiate more than one of these basic
categories. In other words, each class has maximally one single
asserted direct parent class within BFO’s hierarchical taxonomy of
top-level categories [11]. It is possible to adhere to this policy as
long as one only considers the relations between fiat object parts,
objects, and object aggregates belonging to the same general
granularity level (e.g. fiat cell parts, cells, and cell aggregates).
However, as soon as one accounts for the granular nature of the
spatio-structural organization of material entities, it is generally
asserted that multiple inheritance cannot be avoided [11].
The reason for this conclusion is the fact that any particular
material entity instantiates several supposedly disjoint classes. For
instance, every instance of the type CELL (from here onward, we
will use italic upper case for designating types or kinds of material
entity, whereas we use single parenthesis (‘…’) for designating
categories/classes within an ontology) not only instantiates the
class ‘cell’, which would have to be classified as a subcategory of
BFO’s category ‘object’. Because every cell, due to its granular
nature, is composed of aggregated molecules, every instance of
CELL also instantiates a specific subcategory of ‘molecule
aggregate’, which would have to be classified as a subcategory of
BFO’s ‘object aggregate’. Moreover, since molecules are com-
posed of aggregated atoms, every cell instantiates a specific
subcategory of ‘atom aggregate’ as well. In case the cell belongs to
a multicellular organism, it also instantiates the category ‘fiat
multicellular organism part’, which would have to be classified as a
subcategory of BFO’s ‘fiat object part’. The cell may even
instantiate the categories ‘fiat tissue part’ and ‘fiat organ part’ in
case it is part of a particular tissue that is part of a particular
organ (Fig. 2). These multiple cross-granular instantiations are not
restricted to object entities but hold for all particular material
Figure 1. Constitutive Granularity. A constitutive granularity of molecules, cells and organs of a multicellular organism. It is characteristic of
constitutive granularities that all objects belonging to one level of granularity are parts of objects of the next coarser level of granularity: all molecules
are part of cells, all cells part of organs, and all organs part of multicellular organisms. Moreover, the sum of all objects of one level of a constitutive
granularity yields the maximal object, which is in this case a multicellular organism.
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0030004.g001
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cumulative-constitutively organized. They all not only instantiate
an ‘object’ category but also ‘object aggregate’ categories at finer
levels of granularity and ‘fiat object part’ categories at coarser
levels (except they are the finest or coarsest object entities within a
given granular organization).
This interpretation implies that, from a granular perspective,
any type of material entity has more than one parent class and
therefore exhibits multiple inheritance, which violates the single
inheritance policy of BFO. This is why mutual exclusiveness of a
given category is considered to be relative to a given level of
granularity [11], and any application or domain reference
Figure 2. Granular Representation of a Particular Fiat Cell Part, Cell, and Cell Aggregate. At the cellular level a particular fiat cell part
instantiates the ‘fiat cell part’ category, which is a subcategory of ‘fiat object part’. A particular cell instantiates the ‘cell’ category, which isa
subcategory of ‘object’. A particular cell aggregate instantiates the ‘cell aggregate’ category, which is a subcategory of ‘object aggregate’. At the finer
molecular level, they all instantiate different subcategories of ‘molecule aggregate’ (i.e. subcategories of ‘object aggregate’). At the coarser organ and
multicellular organism level they instantiate subcategories of ‘fiat organ part’ and ‘fiat multicellular organism part’ (i.e. subcategories of ‘fiat object
part’). In some cases a particular cell aggregate instantiates a subcategory of ‘organ’ (i.e. subcategory of ‘object’). Although each particular entity
instantiates multiple categories, these categories do not necessarily have to stand in a class-subclass relation to one another. Instead, they are
different granular representations (see 2.2.3 Granular Representation and the Single Inheritance Principle) of the same specific type of material entity (i.e.
FIAT CELL PART, CELL, CELL AGGREGATE).
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0030004.g002
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level of granularity, if it wants to adhere to that policy. If one wants
to refer to a specific type of CELL at a specific level of granularity
one would thus use the respective category of this specific level of
granularity from an ontology that is restricted to this specific level
of granularity and the single inheritance principle would be
satisfied. As a consequence, all relations between entities from
different levels of granularity would then have to be dealt with
using cross-ontology relations. As long as one is only dealing with
constitutively organized material entities, this approach of dealing
with cross-granular multiple instantiation is not only reasonable but
also practicable.
Extending the Basic Formal Ontology. In order to live up
to its role as providing a general template for the top-level
hierarchical structure of various application and domain reference
ontologies for the biomedical domain, BFO’s categories of
material entity must exhaustively cover all possible types of ma-
terial entities relevant to the biomedical domain. By systematically
evaluating all theoretically possible basic constellations of material
building blocks (i.e. constellations of bona fide objects and fiat object
parts), we have demonstrated that the categories of material entity
defined in the current version of BFO (version 1.1; see Table 1) are
not exhaustive and also not sufficiently differentiated in order to
fulfill this task without causing inconsistencies [4]. With several
examples from biology and from everyday life we provided
evidence for the necessity of extending BFO’s categories of
material entity with two additional categories: (i) ‘fiat object part
aggregate’ and (ii) ‘object with fiat object part aggregate’ (Figs. 3,4;
for definitions see Table 2; [4]).
Moreover, by distinguishing topological coherence, topological adherence,
and metric proximity (Table 3), we have suggested to differentiate
between clusters and groups as two distinct subcategories for each of
the three top-level categories of material entity aggregates (Figs. 4,5;
for definitions see Table 2; for a detailed discussion see [4]).
These additions to BFO provide an exhaustive account of all
possible types of material entity and thus eliminate the incon-
sistencies current application ontologies are dealing with when
having to incorrectly classify types of material entity that are
currently not covered by BFO to one of its three top-level categories
(e.g. [20]).
These extensions to BFO are required for realistically modeling
material entities that are organized according to a constitutive
granularity. When evaluating whether the extended BFO lives up
to its intended role of providing a general template for the top-level
hierarchical structure of various biomedical application and
domain reference ontologies, however, it is also essential to
confirm that its underlying granularity scheme is in accordance
with biomedical reality. In other words, we must conduct a reality
check and evaluate whether biological material entities are really
organized according to the presumed constitutive granularity. If
this is not the case, we must evaluate the implications it has for
applying the single inheritance principle and must investigate
whether BFO requires further additions in order to cover also the
cumulative-constitutively organized biological material entities.
Cumulative Constitutive Granularity and its Implications
regarding the Single Inheritance Principle
Conceptualizing organisms along the lines of their part-whole
relations is common practice in biology and results in a
hierarchical system of anatomical terms and concepts that is
usually referred to as levels of (biological) organization or levels of
complexity in the general biological literature ([21,22]; see also scalar
hierarchy, [23,24]; cumulative constitutive hierarchy, [16]; building block
systems, [25]; Theorie des Schichtenbaus der Welt, [26]). The levels of
organization are comparable to the levels of granularity in bioinfor-
matics and ontology literature (e.g., [5,18,27]). Several hierarchical
systems have been proposed in the past in the biological literature
– although not as formally stringent as the granularity schemes
proposed in the bioinformatics literature. Some, like Eldredge’s
somatic hierarchy ([28]; see also [29,30]) are focused on biological
anatomical objects, and usually include ‘subatomic particle’,
‘atom’,‘molecule’,‘organelle’,‘cell’,‘tissue’,’organ’,‘organ
system’,‘individual organism’ as their typical ranks. Considering
the broad consensus among biologists regarding the existence and
nature of such basic categories as ‘organism’, ‘organ’, ‘tissue’, ‘cell’,
‘gene’, and ‘molecule’ [31], it is not surprising that the typical levels
of granularity distinguished by ontology developers usually include
the levels of ‘whole organism’, ‘organ’, ‘tissue/tissue sample’, ‘cell’,
‘subcellular’, and ‘molecular’ [10] and that they thus correlate with
the typical levels of organization distinguished by biologists.
However, despite these similarities, most biologists would disagree
with the implications that the presumption of a constitutive
granularity brings about.
Cumulative Constitutive Granularity of Biological Ma-
terial Entities. Biologists argue that typical biological material
entities, like for instance multicellular organisms, are not organized
according to a constitutive granularity. Instead, their organization
follows a cumulative constitutive hierarchy ([16,32,33]; see also somatic
hierarchy, [28]). Contrary to a constitutive granularity, in a
cumulative constitutive granularity (Fig. 6) not all the objects
belonging to one level of granularity necessarily form parts of
objects of the next higher level of granularity. This is also in
accordance with what we know from reality: not every atom is part
of a molecule: e.g. ions, chlorine radicals, noble gases; not every
molecule is part of a cell: e.g. extracellular matrix (ECM), which is
Figure 3. First Order Categories of Material Entity. A) –C) The
three different top-level categories of material entity that the Basic
Formal Ontology currently distinguishes (BFO, version 1.1). D) & E) Two
additional top-level categories of material entity that are currently not
recognized by BFO. With the exception of ‘object’, all categories possess
some fiat boundary and thus are fiat wholes. (modified from [4]).
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0030004.g003
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material entity and important subcategories that can be distinguished in constitutively organized material entities. Black boxes indicate Basic Formal
Ontology (BFO) categories of material entity and dark grey boxes the additional categories suggested by [4]. (modified from [4]).
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0030004.g004
Table 2. Definitions of additional Top-Level Categories of Material Entity for the Basic Formal Ontology (from [4]).
Definition
Parent Class
Affiliation
‘fiat object part aggregate’: A material entity that is a mereological sum of separate (i.e. not sharing a fiat boundary with each other)
fiat object part entities and possesses non-connected fiat boundaries. Examples: a synapse, the fingers of a hand, a joint, a door hinge,
hydrogen bond between molecules, an estuary, mainland of the Russian Federation, mainland of Turkey
‘material entity’
‘object with fiat object part aggregate’: A material entity that is a mereological sum of separate (i.e. not sharing a fiat boundary
with each other) object and fiat object part entities and possesses non-connected boundaries. Examples: a human heart, a power outlet,
a train station, a traditional telephone cord connection between two telephones, the territories of Turkey and of England
‘material entity’
‘object group’: An object aggregate that is a mereological sum of spatially separated object entities, which do not adhere to one another
through chemical bonds or physical junctions but, instead, relate to one another merely on grounds of metric proximity. The objects can be
separated from one another through space or through other object entities that do not belong to the group. Examples: a heap of stones, a
colony of honeybees, the trees of a forest, the fish of a shoal, a group of commuters on the subway, the patients in a hospital
‘object aggregate’
‘object cluster’: An object aggregate that is a mereological sum of separate object entities, which adhere to one another through
chemical bonds or physical junctions that go beyond gravity. Examples: the atoms of a molecule, the molecules forming the membrane of
a cell, the epidermis in a human body
‘object aggregate’
‘fiat object part group’: A fiat object part aggregate that is a mereological sum of spatially separated fiat object part entities, which
do not adhere to one another through chemical bonds or physical junctions but, instead, relate to one another merely on grounds of metric
proximity. The fiat object parts can be separated from one another through space or through other material entities that do not belong to
the group. Examples: the fingers of a hand, a joint, a door hinge, opposite riverside sections, mainland of the Russian Federation
‘fiat object part
aggregate’
‘fiat object part cluster’: A fiat object part aggregate that is a mereological sum of separate fiat object part entities, which adhere to
one another through chemical bonds or physical junctions that go beyond gravity. Examples: synapse, hydrogen bond between molecules,
an estuary, mainland of Turkey
‘fiat object part
aggregate’
‘object with fiat object part group’: An object with fiat object part aggregate that is a mereological sum of spatially separated object
entities and fiat object part entities, which do not adhere to one another through chemical bonds or physical junctions but, instead, relate
to one another merely on grounds of metric proximity. The objects and fiat object parts can be separated from one another through space
or through other material entities that do not belong to the group. Examples: the equilibrium organ of a lobster, a modern wireless cell
phone connection, the territories of Turkey and of England
‘object with fiat
object part
aggregate’
‘object with fiat object part cluster’: An object with fiat object part aggregate that is a mereological sum of separate object entities and
fiat object part entities, all of which adhere to one another through chemical bonds or physical junctions that go beyond gravity. Examples:
a human heart, a power outlet, a train station, a traditional telephone cord connection between two telephones, a polyplacophoran aesthete
‘object with fiat
object part
aggregate’
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0030004.t002
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organs and is located outside of cells; not every cell is part of an
organ: e.g. erythrocytes, coelomocytes, leukocytes, sperms, egg
cells.
As a consequence, and again contrary to a constitutive gran-
ularity, all the objects that share the same granularity level not
always exhaustively sum to the maximal whole (contradicting, e.g.,
[18,34]): The totality of all molecules existing in the universe at
any given moment in time does not exhaustively sum to the
universe as a whole, because there always exist some free atoms
and ions that are not part of any molecule; neither does the totality
of all atoms exhaustively sum to the universe as a whole, because
there always exist free subatomic particles that are not part of any
atom; moreover, with respect to most multicellular metazoans (e.g.
humans) the totality of cells does not sum to the body as a whole,
since that would mean to ignore the extracellular matrix in which
the cells are embedded and which provides the topological grid
that keeps the cells in their relative position, thereby integrating
the cell aggregate into a topological and biological functional
whole.
A direct consequence from a cumulative constitutive organiza-
tion of material entities is that the granularity scheme and the
axioms for partitioning material entities are more complicated
than they are for constitutively organized material entities (for a
theory of granularity for cumulative constitutively organized
material entities see [19], which is based on Keet’s general formal
theory of granularity, [27]).
Surprisingly, although ontology-related research represents a
very active field within the biomedical domain and although many
biomedical ontologies have been developed (for a list of freely
available ontologies see, e.g., NCBO BioPortal, http://bioportal.
bioontology.org/, and the Open Biological and Biomedical
Ontologies, OBO, http://www.obofoundry.org/), granularity
schemes and biomedical ontologies nonetheless commonly pre-
suppose material entities to be universally organized following a
constitutive hierarchy (for an exception see [19]).
Trans-Granular Multiple Instantiation of the Same Type
of Material Entity in a Cumulative Constitutive Gran-
ularity. Cumulative-constitutively organized material entities
pose problems to ontology design because ontologies are dealing
with types (i.e. classes) of material entities. The problems would
not exist if ontologies dealt with particular instances or only with
constitutively organized material entities. Why this is the case can
best be explained with an example: One can partition a
multicellular organism into its direct proper objet parts (Fig. 7A).
If multicellular organisms were constitutively organized (Fig. 7A
left), this compositional object partition would be straight forward.
In a first step, the entire organism would be partitioned into its
constitutive organ parts. All organs of the multicellular organism
would belong to the same cut in the corresponding instance
granularity tree (for cuts see [35,36]) and thus to the same instance
granularity level. In a next step, each organ could be further
partitioned into its specific direct proper cell parts, forming
another cut in the tree and the adjacently finer instance
granularity level. As a result, all cells of the multicellular
organism would belong to the next finer level of instance
granularity. This procedure can be repeated several times, as
long as parts of one cut can still be further partitioned into finer
object parts (e.g. cells into their organelle parts, organelles into
their molecule parts, etc.). All these partitions would result in a set
of cuts that constitute an instance granularity tree of particular
bona fide object entities (Fig. 7B left). All instances belonging to one
cut would instantiate the same top-level object type: the first cut
would contain all the organs of the multicellular organism, the
next cut all its cells, and so on. All object entities of a certain type
would belong to the same cut and thus the same instance
granularity level.
Therefore, transforming the instance granularity tree into a type
granularity tree would be straight forward: for a given constitutively
organized object the instance granularity tree and the type
granularity tree are topologically identical (Fig. 7B,C left). As a
consequence, the single inheritance principle could be applied to
all categories of material entity relative to a given type granularity
level, because their extensions do not cross the boundary between
different instance granularity levels, and the instance granularity
levels correspond with the type granularity levels.
Unfortunately, reality is not that simple. As mentioned above,
multicellular organisms are cumulative-constitutively organized
(Fig. 7A right). As a consequence, their direct proper object parts
are not restricted to objects of the same top-level object type.
Partitioning a multicellular organism yields in a first step
individual organs surrounded by individual cells that are not part
of any organ as well as by individual molecules that are neither
part of any organ nor any cell, all of which represent direct proper
parts of the multicellular organism (Fig. 7B right). Although these
particular parts instantiate different types of material entity, they
nevertheless all belong to the same cut in the corresponding
instance granularity tree and thus to the same instance granularity
level (see also [19]).
This example clearly demonstrates the problems with cumula-
tive-constitutively organized material entities: different particular
instances of the same type of material entity (e.g. the type
MOLECULE) can belong to different cuts and thus different levels
of instance granularity. In other words, the extensions of some
types of material entities transcend the boundary between different
levels of instance granularity (Fig. 7B,C right). Therefore, and
contrary to constitutively organized material entities, for a
given cumulative-constitutively organized entity the instance
granularity tree and the type granularity tree cannot share the
same topology. Transforming the instance granularity tree of a
Table 3. Three Foundational Types of Spatio-Topological Relations between Material Entities (from [4]).
Type of
material entity
Relation between
its parts
Type of inner boundary
separating its parts Characteristics
object or fiat
object part
topological coherence fiat boundary
mat between fiat object parts Coherence implies physical continuity and qualitative
homogeneity within the object or fiat object part
object cluster topological adherence bona fide boundary between objects Adherence implies physical continuity and qualitative
heterogeneity within the object cluster
object group metric proximity bona fide boundary and fiat boundary
immat
between objects
Metric proximity implies physical separation through spatial
gaps between the constitutive objects of the object group
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0030004.t003
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sponding type granularity tree is thus not as straight forward as it is for
constitutively organized material entities [19].
The applicability of the single inheritance principle is also
affected: not only its general global application is problematic, as
we already discussed further above with respect to the implications
of a constitutive granularity, but for cumulative-constitutively
organized material entities its application relative to a given level
of type granularity is also problematic and not directly practicable,
because the extensions of categories of cumulative-constitutively
organized material entities transcend the boundary between
different instance granularity levels.
Figure 5. Second Order Categories of Material Entity. Possible subcategories of the three top-level categories of material entity aggregates (I–
III) that can be differentiated on grounds of distinguishing two types of relation between the entities of the aggregate (i.e. metric proximity and
topological adherence) and the presence or lack of fiat boundaries
immat: (i) Clusters are not demarcated by fiat boundaries
immat and are further
characterized by topological adherence relations between the entities of the aggregate (through chemical bonds or physical junctions). (ii) Groups are
demarcated by fiat boundaries
immat and are further characterized by metric proximity relations between the entities of the aggregate – they lack
adherence. Since also several clusters can spatially relate to one another on grounds of metric proximity, clusters can be parts of groups as well. A)–D)
The four subcategories of ‘object aggregate’ – an ‘object cluster’ and three subcategories of ‘object group’, all of which either consist of objects,
object clusters, or both. Note that an object cluster is only demarcated by bona fide boundaries and thus does not represent a fiat whole. E)–H) The
four subcategories of ‘fiat object part aggregate’ – a ‘fiat object part cluster’ and three subcategories of ‘fiat object part group’, all of which either
consist of fiat object parts, fiat object part clusters, or both. I)–K) Four out of 26 subcategories of ‘object with fiat object part aggregate’ – an ‘object
with fiat object part cluster’ and three out of 25 possible subcategories of ‘object with fiat object part group’. Fiat boundary
mat: demarcates fiat parts
of a material entity; fiat boundary
immat: demarcates fiat parts of an immaterial entity (i.e. a hole). (modified from [4]).
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0030004.g005
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that allows the representation of anatomical structures that are
composed of direct proper parts belonging to different levels of
granularity (see e.g. [37]) does not solve this problem either. It
merely demarcates the problematic cumulative-constitutively
organized anatomical structures from the unproblematic constitu-
tively organized ones.
One intuitive solution for transforming the instance granularity
tree into a type granularity tree for a cumulative constitutive
granularity is a sortation-by-type ([19]) that can best be understood as
a granular sedimentation of all the instances of one type to the
finest level of granularity that one of them occupies, resulting in
the types being ranked according to the finest level of granularity
at which their instances occur (Fig. 7C right). Sortation-by-type
alone, however, is insufficient, since it has undesirable side effects
regarding the consistency of granular partitions of types of material
entities ([19]). If the assumption that all material entities of a given
level of granularity must sum to the complete whole should also
apply to cumulative-constitutively organized entities, we required
categories for the trans-granular instantiations that the extended
BFO does not provide: we required a category for molecules at
levels coarser than the molecular level and a category for cells at
levels coarser than the cellular level of type granularity (marked
‘???’ in Fig. 7C right).
For instance the ECM of a multicellular organism belongs,
through sortation-by-type and in virtue of its respective instance
granularity tree, not only to the organ type granularity level
(alongside with the organism’s organs), but also to the cellular type
granularity level alongside with the organism’s cells and to the
molecular type granularity level alongside with the organism’s
other molecules (Fig. 7B,C right). Only this way, the above-
mentioned assumption can be maintained. Referring to ECM as
‘fiat organ part’ or ‘fiat multicellular organism part’ within the
cellular type granularity level does not adequately account for the
trans-granular multiple instantiation that results from a cumulative
constitutive granularity, neither does restricting a type to a specific
level of a type granularity. Therefore, another rule is required for
the transformation of an instance to a type granularity tree. This
involves the notion of granular representation, which should allow
maintaining the single inheritance principle across different levels
of granularity.
Granular Representation and the Single Inheritance
Principle. Due to the trans-granular multiple instantiation that
is characteristic for cumulative-constitutively organized material
entities, for a given type of entity different categories are required
at different levels of granularity. These categories cannot be
derived from extended BFO’s categories of material entity. Thus,
if ontologies shall cover also cumulative-constitutively organized
material entities, they must somehow integrate different levels of
type granularity and cannot be restricted to a single type
granularity level. What does that imply for ontology design and
the organization of top-level categories of material entity in a
formal top-level ontology like BFO? Must the single inheritance
principle necessarily be abandoned for ontologies covering also
cumulative-constitutively organized material entities?
Ontologies that integrate several type granularity levels are
faced with the following situation: not only does every cell of a
multicellular organism instantiate ‘molecule aggregate
cell’, which is
the class of those molecule aggregates that are cells and thus a
specific subcategory of ‘molecule aggregate’, but every instance of
this ‘molecule aggregate
cell’ instantiates also the category ‘cell’. In
other words, some molecule aggregates, which we here call
‘molecule aggregate
cell’, are cells and all cells are molecule
aggregates. Therefore, these two categories, ‘cell’ and ‘molecule
aggregate
cell’, share the same extension (i.e. every entity that
instantiates ‘cell’ also instantiates ‘molecule aggregate
cell’, and vice
versa) and thus refer to the same type of material entity. If
according to the single inheritance principle two different
categories are instantiated by the same particular material entity,
one category must be subsumed under the other. In the example
above, however, the two categories share the same extension, so
how can one of these two categories be subsumed under the other?
They would have to subsume each other, thereby implying that
they are ontologically identical – two mappings of the same real
world entity ([19]).
However, in this context it is important to keep in mind that the
instantiation relation between a particular cell and the ‘object’
subcategory ‘cell’ entails the reference to the cellular level of
granularity as an implicit condition: this entity is an object only at
the cellular level of granularity. At all other levels of granularity it
is not an object. The other instantiation relations of that particular
cell entail references to other granularity levels as their implicit
conditions (A1): For all entities X of type CELL holds that X
instance_of ‘object aggregate’ iff granularity level,cellular; for all
entities X of type CELL holds that X instance_of ‘object’ iff
granularity level=cellular; for all entities X of type CELL holds
that X instance_of ‘fiat object part’ iff granularity level.cellular.
As a consequence, which of the many granular representations
one uses for referring to a particular cell directly depends on the
level of granular focus that one has chosen. Whereas this multiple
Figure 6. Cumulative Constitutive Granularity. A cumulative
constitutive granularity of a multicellular organism consisting of
molecules, organelles, cells, and organs. It is characteristic of cumulative
constitutive granularities that not all objects belonging to one
granularity level are parts of objects at the next coarser level of
granularity – they only have to be part of the maximal whole, which is
in this case a multicellular organism. Molecules exist that are not part of
cells and cells that are not part of organs. As a consequence, the sum of
all objects of one level of a cumulative constitutive granularity does not
necessarily yield the maximal object.
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0030004.g006
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PLoS ONE | www.plosone.org 9 January 2012 | Volume 7 | Issue 1 | e30004Figure 7. Trans-Granular Multiple Instantiation and the Distinction of Instance Granularity and Type Granularity. A) Left:
Compositional partitions of a constitutively organized idealized multicellular organism into its constitutive object parts. Four partitions are shown: (i)
into organs (f); (ii) into organ cells (e); (iii) into organelles (c,d) of organ cells; and (iv) into organelle molecules (a,b). Right: Compositional partitions of
a cumulative-constitutively organized idealized multicellular organism into its constitutive object parts. The same corresponding four partitions are
shown: (i) into organs (j) alongside with cells (i) and extracellular molecules (g,h), both of which are not part of any organ; (ii) into organ cells (q) and
extracellular molecules (o,p) that are part of some organ, organelles (m,n) that are part of cells which are not part of any organ, and cellular molecules
(k,l) that are neither part of any organ nor any organelle; (iii) into organelles (v,w) of organ cells and molecules (t,u) that are part of these organ cells
but not part of any organelle, as well as molecules (r,s) of organelles of cells which are not part of any organ; and (iv) into organelle molecules (x,y)
that are part of organ cells. B) Left: The instance granularity tree of constitutively organized bona fide objects based on the corresponding four
partitions. Each partition constitutes a cut in the instance granularity tree (Cut I–IV) and thus an instance granularity level. Contrary to cumulative-
constitutively organized material entities, particular instances of the same type of material entity do not belong to different cuts and thus are
restricted to a single level of instance granularity. The types’ extensions do not transcend the boundaries between instance granularity levels. Right:
The instance granularity tree of cumulative-constitutively organized bona fide objects based on the corresponding four partitions. Particular instances
of the same type of material entity, like for instance of the type MOLECULE, belong to different cuts and thus different levels of the respective instance
granularity. In other words, the extension of the type MOLECULE transcends the boundaries between instance granularity levels. C) Left: The
constitutive instance granularity tree that results from the corresponding four partitions can be directly transformed into the respective type
Accommodating Ontologies to Biological Reality
PLoS ONE | www.plosone.org 10 January 2012 | Volume 7 | Issue 1 | e30004instantiation does not violate the single inheritance principle, its
implications for the corresponding class-subclass relations does:
when expressing a possible class-subclass relation between the
category ‘cell’ and BFO’s category ‘object’, one must also entail
the reference to the cellular level of granularity as an implicit
condition of this relation, as does a possible class-subclass relation
to BFO’s ‘object aggregate’ implicitly entail the reference to all
granularity levels finer than the cellular level, and a relation to
BFO’s ‘fiat object part’ the reference to all granularity levels
coarser than the cellular level (A2): ‘cell’ is_a ‘object aggregate’ iff
granularity level,cellular; ‘cell’ is_a ‘object’ iff granularity
level=cellular; ‘cell’ is_a ‘fiat object part’ iff granularity level.
cellular. This, however, would imply that BFO’s top-level
categories of material entity are not mutually disjoint.
The specific categories ‘atom aggregate
cell’, ‘molecule aggrega-
te
cell’, ‘cell’, and ‘fiat organ part
cell’, which share the same
extension, can be subsumed under BFO’s top-level categories of
material entity requiring corresponding conditional extensions
(A3): ‘atom aggregate
cell’ is_a ‘object aggregate’ iff granularity
level=atomic; ‘molecule aggregate
cell’ is_a ‘object aggregate’ iff
granularity level=molecular; ‘cell’ is_a ‘object’ iff granularity
level=cellular; ‘fiat organ part
cell’ is_a ‘fiat object part’ iff
granularity level=organ level.
How can we organize these relations within a single ontology
while still following the single inheritance principle? In case of
constitutively organized material entities this problem is side-
stepped by restricting each ontology to cover only entities that
belong to the same level of granularity and using cross-ontology
relations to refer to entities from different granularity levels. Due
to the trans-granular multiple instantiation of cumulative-consti-
tutively organized material entities discussed above, this elegant
solution cannot be applied to a cumulative constitutive granularity.
Whereas the classes ‘atom aggregate
cell’, ‘molecule aggregate
cell’,
‘cell’, and ‘fiat organ part
cell’ share the same extension and thus are
representations of the same general type CELL (see also Fig. 2),
due to the implicit granular condition of reference, epistemolog-
ically they nevertheless cannot be strictly synonymized. Therefore,
instead of relating these categories with one another using the
subsumption relation one must apply the specific relation of
granular representation (i.e. has_coarser_representation, has_fi-
ner_representation; see also Fig. 2). Using this relation, one can
treat ‘atom aggregate
cell’, ‘molecule aggregate
cell’, ‘cell’, and ‘fiat
organ part
cell’ as different representations of the same type CELL
within different granular levels – they are the granular represen-
tations of a cell at the atom, molecule, cell and organ level of
granularity. Therefore, the conditional extension belongs to the
granular representation relation and not to the class-subclass
relation. As a consequence, we can conclude that the second set of
assertions (A2) is incorrect and they must be modified to: CELL
has_granular_representation ‘atom aggregate
cell’ iff granularity
level=atomic; CELL has_granular_representation ‘molecule ag-
gregatecell’ iff granularity level=molecular; CELL has_granu-
lar_representation ‘cell’ iff granularity level=cellular; CELL
has_granular_representation ‘fiat organ part
cell’ iff granularity
level=organ.
In this way, the different categories relate to one another in
dependence of a given granularity scheme and at the same time
the single inheritance policy can be applied across multiple
granularity levels. In case one is exclusively dealing with
constitutively organized material entities, granular representation
serves as the cross-ontology relation between the different
categories belonging to different levels of granularity that are
instantiated by the same particular material entity. One can switch
between the different granular representations of a given type of
material entity and can distinguish them although they refer to
the same type of entity. Which representation is used for referring
to a real world entity results from the combination of the entity
type and the scale or level of granularity at which it is considered
([19]; see sgrG granularity type, [27,38]).
Cross-Granular Instantiation and Granular Repre-
sentation. With the notion of granular representation we can now
deal with the problem of trans-granular instantiations of the same
type of material entity in a cumulative constitutive granularity. If
one uses different granular representations for referring to the
instances of the same type of material entity that belong to
different levels of the instance granularity tree, a specific type of
material entity could belong to more than one type granularity
level and the instance granularity tree could be transformed to the
type granularity tree (see Fig. 7C). As a matter of fact, contrary to
the instance granularity tree, the corresponding type granularity
tree would then not be restricted to object entities, but will include
other top-level categories as well (compare Fig. 7C right, the
entities marked ‘???’, and right). Granular representations are thus
required in order to account for the trans-granular instantiations of
cumulative-constitutively organized types of material entities.
Complementing the Extended Basic Formal Ontology to
also Cover Cumulative-Constitutively Organized Material
Entities
In order to be able to transform instance granularity trees of
cumulative-constitutively organized material entities into type
granularity trees we must provide additional categories to accom-
modate for trans-granular multiple instantiation. These additional
categories must be used in combination with the notion of
granular representation. We require for instance a category for
representing extra-cellular molecules at levels coarser than the
molecular level and a category for representing cells occurring
outside from organs at levels coarser than the cellular level of type
granularity (see Fig. 7C right, categories marked ‘???’). What are
these additional categories?
In a constitutive granularity, at the cellular level a particular
cluster of molecules constitutes either a ‘fiat cell part’, ‘fiat cell part
cluster’, ‘cell’, ‘cell with fiat cell part cluster’, or a ‘cell cluster’. This
is no surprise since every molecule is part of some object of the
next coarser level of constitutive granularity. In a cumulative
constitutive granularity, however, this is not the case. Here,
molecule clusters exist that neither instantiate ‘fiat cell part’, nor
one of the other categories of the cellular level mentioned above.
This is due to the fact that not every molecule is necessarily part of
granularity tree – no sortation required since they are topologically identical. Right: The cumulative constitutive instance granularity tree that results
from the corresponding four partitions cannot be directly transformed into or mapped upon the respective type granularity tree. However, by (i)
following the simple and intuitive rule of sortation-by-type (i.e. a type occupies the same granularity level as its finest grained instance) and by (ii)
applying a more complicated granularity scheme (Vogt 2010), one can infer a type granularity tree. Unfortunately, this results in types of entities
belonging to type granularity levels for which BFO provides no respective categories as templates for granularity specific ontologies (here marked
‘???’). For instance when looking at the cellular level, a cellular ontology that is based on BFO provides no category for molecules that are not part of
any cell, since they are neither a cell (i.e. BFO’s ‘object’), nor a cell aggregate (i.e. BFO’s ‘object aggregate’) or fiat cell part (i.e. BFO’s ‘fiat object part’),
nor any of the additional categories of the extended BFO. (modified from [19]).
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0030004.g007
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these molecule clusters constitute instead at coarser levels of
granularity? What is ECM at the cellular level?
At the cellular level of granularity, ECM is beyond the coverage
of the top-level categories discusses so far. One would have to
switch the level of granular focus to coarser levels of granularity in
order to find an adequate category for ECM, like for instance ‘fiat
organ part’ or ‘fiat multicellular organism part’.
Some molecule clusters constitute cell clusters and the ECM in
which the cells are embedded. Consequently, these would have to
be referred to as ‘cell with fiat organ part cluster’ at the cellular
level of granularity (Fig. 8). In multicellular animals most cell
clusters are actually such cell with fiat organ part clusters. A
category ‘cell with fiat organ part cluster’, however, as the
reference to fiat organ parts implies, requires the reference to a
level of granularity that is coarser than the cellular level,
irrespective of the fact that the actual level of granular focus is
on the cellular level. This is rather awkward and in some cases
also not desirable. For instance, if one is dealing with a tissue
sample of unknown origin and one has no information regarding
the organ from which it has been taken, or if one wants to
describe a tissue sample without reference to the organ level at
all. Moreover, if the assumption that all parts that share the same
instance granularity level exhaustively sum to the whole should
also apply to cumulative-constitutively organized material
entities, we required a category for referring to ECM at the
cellular level, because ECM does exist at that level and it is not
part of any cell.
Portion of Matter. In order to be able to refer to ECM at
levels of granularity coarser than the molecular level we introduce
the category ‘portion of matter’ (c. f. amount of matter sensu [39],
masses sensu [40], portion of unstructured/structured stuff sensu [41], and
to a limited degree also to body substance sensu [42] and portion of
body substance sensu [43]).
Definition for ‘portion of matter’. A material entity that is not
demarcated by any physical discontinuities. At some finer level of granularity it
is an object aggregate, at some coarser level of granularity it is a fiat object part,
but at this level of granularity it is neither.
Explanation. What is a molecule cluster at the cellular level?
Contrary to the molecular level, at the cellular level of granularity
the boundary of each molecule is outside of the level of granular
focus. What forms a discontinuous cluster of countable individual
molecules and thus bona fide objects at the molecular level, is a
continuous and non-countable molecular substance at coarser levels of
granularity. At these coarser levels, the individual molecules
cannot be differentiated and demarcated anymore and the cluster
as a whole possesses only fiat inner boundaries.
This granularity dependence of inner boundaries can be
characterized with the distinction of topological adherence and
topological coherence (see Table 3; [4]): topological adherence between
the objects of an object cluster of a given level of granularity is
treated as topological coherence at coarser levels. Therefore,
objects within the cluster cannot be differentiated anymore at
coarser levels of granularity, because their bona fide boundaries
disintegrate at these coarser levels and only fiat boundaries remain.
As a consequence, at levels coarser than the molecular level of
granularity a molecule cluster is not necessarily an object cluster
anymore (see above, Fig. 8). Instead, at these levels a molecule
cluster often constitutes a fiat entity. While this does not pose any
problem for constitutively organized material entities, since any
molecule cluster is part of an object of the adjacently coarser level
of granularity and thus can be referred to as a fiat object part at
Figure 8. A Cluster of Cells at the Molecular and the Cellular Level of Granularity. Left - A material entity that is a cluster of molecules at
the molecular level of granularity. The molecule cluster constitutes two cells embedded in extracellular matrix (ECM). The two cells are connected
with each other via a cell-cell junction. The molecules form a molecule cluster since they are connected with each other via molecular bonds. Right -
The same material entity at the cellular level of granularity in which it is a cell cluster with portion of ECM cluster. The cell molecules constitute two
cells that are connected via a cell-cell junction, thus forming a cell cluster. The ECM molecules form a portion of ECM that is a fiat entity.
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0030004.g008
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entities.
The here proposed distinction of countable objects and non-
countable portions of matter resembles the linguistic distinction of the
grammatical concepts of count-nouns and mass-nouns [18]. Count-
nouns, like for instance table, stone or cell, can be used in the
singular and in the plural, whereas mass-nouns, like for instance
gold, blood or tissue, are typically considered to be invariable in
grammatical number [44,45]. If mass-nouns are treated as non-
singular terms (see [46]), however, the distinction of count-nouns
and mass-nouns correlates also semantically with the here
proposed distinction of countable objects and non-countable
portions of matter. As mass-nouns, and because portions of matter are
fiat entities, they require some arbitrary but standardized
quantification measure (e.g. a glass of water, 1m
3 of soil, 25g sugar,
250ml orange juice, 1km
2 forest).
Examples. Taking a cluster of H2O molecules as an example:
while at the molecular level of granularity the individual H2O
molecules of a particular H2O cluster are distinguishable and
countable. Their representation (not their ontological nature!)
changes at coarser levels of granularity. Here, the individual
molecules of the H2O cluster are not countable anymore (i.e. they
are outside of the level of granular focus) and the cluster is
represented as a portion of water, which is a specific type of portion of
molecular substance, which at its turn is a subcategory of portion of
matter. Thus, it is the granular representation of the real world entity
type H2O CLUSTER that is different at different levels of
granularity [19,27].
In a similar manner one can differentiate between a particular
cytosol molecule cluster at the molecular level and a portion of cytosol
at the organelle level of granularity (Table 4). Both are granular
representations of the same type of material entity (i.e. CYTOSOL).
We use the former when we are interested in the actual molecular
composition of the cytosol and the latter when we lack knowledge
or simply do not care about the exact number, topological
positions, and types of molecules that constitute it. In general, we
can say that at granularity levels coarser than the molecule level,
all fluids and extracellular substances of an organism, as for
instance dentin, are portions of molecular substance.
Some types of portions of molecular substance are not part of
any organelle (e.g. blood plasma, cerebrospinal fluid, cytosol,
gastric juice, lymph, mucus, peritoneal fluid, saliva, seminal
plasma, secret in a multicellular gland, urine) and thus cannot
constitute a fiat organelle part. At the cellular level, ECM is not a
fiat cell part either (Table 4). Since they lack bona fide boundaries,
these various types of portions of matter nevertheless constitute fiat
entities. But these fiat entities lack their parthood counterpart in
the respective granularity levels, since they are fiat parts of objects
at a coarser level of granularity and therefore cannot be referred to
as fiat object parts at these levels of granular focus.
On coarser granularity levels object aggregates do not possess
their own boundaries and referring to them using the ‘fiat object
part’ category requires the reference to objects at coarser levels. In
this respect, portions of matter are comparable to negative entities
(i.e. immaterial entities, such as tunnels, caves, and hollows) that
also do not possess their own boundaries. This, however, is not
problematic, since the expression portion of matter as proposed here
already implies fiatness of the respective entity without requiring
reference to coarser objects. Consequently, though at the cellular
level ECM does not constitute a fiat cell part, as a portion of ECM it
is nevertheless designated as a fiat entity (Fig. 8). In this way, one
can refer to ECM within a cellular level of granular focus without
having to refer to any categories from coarser levels of granularity.
One could also say that, ontologically, a portion of matter is
situated in the border region between an object aggregate at a
finer level of granularity and a fiat object part at a coarser level. A
portion of matter is in a no man’s land, taking in a granular
intermediate state in which it is neither an object aggregate nor a
fiat object part, but something in between.
Since portions of matter are representations of object aggregates
at levels of granularity coarser than their respective object level,
object aggregates involving different types of objects are not
ontologically distinguished at the level of ‘portion of matter’ from
those involving only one type of object. As a consequence, at this
taxonomic level solutions are not distinguished from pure stuffs: a
portion of lemonade and a portion of pure distilled water are both
portions of matter, irrespective of their different molecular
composition.
Additional Top-Level Categories resulting from Portion
of Matter as another Building Block. In a constitutive
granularity, every material entity either is an object, a fiat object
part, or any possible combination and topological distribution of
aggregates thereof. Therefore, ‘object’ and ‘fiat object part’
represent the basic building blocks of the top-level categories of
constitutively organized material entities [4]. The top-level
categories of material entity, at their turn, can be distinguished
by the composition and topological distribution of these building
blocks. The set of possible constellations of the two building blocks
exhaustively covers all possible types of constitutively organized
material entities [4].
Unfortunately, the set of possible constellations of the two
building blocks does not exhaustively cover all possible types of
cumulative-constitutively organized material entities. The exam-
ples from above demonstrate that in a cumulative constitutive
granularity we require ‘portion of matter’ as an additional building
block for all those cases in which objects are not part of objects of
the adjacently coarser level of granularity. Adding ‘portion of
matter’ as another building block yields a variety of additional top-
level categories of material entity that result from all possible
constellations of ‘portion of matter’ with itself and with the other
Table 4. Three Types of Material Entity and their different Granularity Representations at Four Levels of Granularity.
Type Granularity level
Molecule Organelle Cell Organ
CYTOSOL molecule cluster portion of cytosol fiat cell part fiat organ part
ECM molecule cluster portion of ECM portion of ECM portion of ECM or fiat organ part
CELL CLUSTER molecule cluster organelle group with portion of
cytosol and portion of ECM cluster
cell cluster with portion
of ECM cluster
intra-organ: fiat organ part or organ
extra-organ: portion of tissue
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0030004.t004
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tions (Fig. 9).
One can distinguish two basic types of additional categories: (i)
material entities that involve portions of matter but are composed
of objects of the same granularity level, and (ii) material entities
that involve portions of matter that are composed of objects or
parts of objects of more than one granularity level and thus are
granular mixture aggregates (for definitions see Table S1). The
former comprises ‘portion of matter group’, which is a group of
portions of matter that are spatially separated (e.g. group of portions of
dentine of an individual human being, with each portion belonging
to a separate tooth), ‘portion of matter cluster’, which is a cluster of
spatially distinct portions of matter entities (e.g. portion of human tooth
substance cluster, which consists of a cluster of spatially distinct
portions of matter, i.e. enamel, dentin, cementum), and ‘portion of
matter cluster group’, which is a group of spatially separated
portion of matter cluster entities (e.g. group of all portions of human
tooth substance clusters of an individual human being). All other
additional categories are granular mixture aggregates (definitions
see Table S1).
Definition for ‘granular mixture aggregate’. A material
entity that is a mereological sum of several separate material entities of different
granularity levels and possesses non-connected boundaries.
Explanation and Examples. Characteristic for the
cumulative constitutive granularity is the existence of various
types of material entities that are composed of objects of different
levels of granularity, like object clusters that are embedded in a
portion of matter, as for instance cells in extracellular matrix (i.e.
ECM). The distinction of count-nouns and mass-nouns mentioned
above also applies to ECM: At granularity levels coarser than the
molecule level we refer to ECM using the mass-noun portion of
ECM. As a consequence, at the cellular level of granularity a
cluster of cells embedded in ECM is a cell cluster with portion of ECM
cluster, which is a subcategory of ‘object cluster with portion of
matter cluster’ (definition see Table S1). When considering only
single cells and their surrounding ECM, they are cell with portion of
ECM cluster entities, which belong to the subcategory ‘object with
portion of matter cluster’, and spatially separated groups of such
clusters are cell with portion of ECM cluster group entities, which belong
to the category ‘object with portion of matter cluster group’.
In case one differentiates an organelle level from a molecule and
a cell level of granularity, one also has to deal with molecules that
are not part of any organelle (e.g. ECM, cytosol). In this case, a cell
is an organelle group with portion of cytosol cluster at the organelle level of
granularity, which is a subcategory of ‘object group with portion of
matter cluster’ (definition see Table S1). Human blood at the
cellular level is another example for an ‘object group with portion
of matter cluster’. Blood at the cellular level is a blood cell group with
portion of blood plasma cluster, since the individual blood cells are
spatially separated from one another and surrounded by blood
plasma, which, at its turn, is a molecule cluster at the molecular
level of granularity.
Sometimes, it is necessary to only refer to specific parts of a
cumulative-constitutively organized material entity. For instance,
when talking about the group of blood vessels of a human lung or
of other human organs. Blood vessels in humans are always
accompanied by ECM and form a continuously connected
network that constitutes the cardiovascular system, which is a
bona fide object. The blood vessels of the lung therefore represent
an aggregate of specific parts of this system, each of which are
demarcated from the remaining cardiovascular system by fiat
boundaries. As the blood vessels of the lung are spatially separated
distinct fiat parts of the system as a whole, which, as fiat parts, are
not all directly connected with each other (only indirectly via the
remaining vessels of the cardiovascular system), they form a fiat
object part group that is accompanied by some portion of ECM. The
same applies to the vessels of other human organs. As such, they
are fiat cardiovascular system part group with portion of ECM clusters,
which is a subcategory of ‘fiat object part group with portion of
matter cluster’ (definition see Table S1). When considering their
spatial distribution and topological constellation within a human
individual, they form a group of fiat cardiovascular system part group
with portion of ECM clusters, which is a subcategory of ‘fiat object
part group with portion of matter cluster group’ (definition see
Table S1).
A synapse is an example of a fiat object part cluster with portion of
matter cluster entity (definition see Table S1). A synapse is commonly
considered to be an intercellular junction composed of the
presynaptic zone of a neuron and the postsynaptic zone of
another neuron, muscle cell or secretory cell, with an intervening
synaptic cleft between these two zones. The two pre- and
postsynaptic zones of a synapse are fiat cell parts that form a fiat
cell part cluster, whereas the cleft is filled with some portion of
intercellular fluid. Thus, a synapse is a fiat object part cluster with portion
of matter cluster entity. Other intercellular junctions, as for instance
desmosomes, are also examples of fiat object part cluster with portion of
matter cluster entities, since they are physical junctions in which
transmembrane proteins from two adjacent epithelial cells bridge
the space between them, forming a fiat object part cluster, and the
space between them is filled with some portion of extracellular liquid.
The topological constellation of several synapses or several
desmosomes of an individual human being forms a group of fiat
object part cluster with portion of matter clusters, which is a subcategory of
‘fiat object part cluster with portion of matter cluster group’
(definition see Table S1).
In order to identify all major categories of cumulative-
constitutively organized material entities, the building block
‘portion of matter’ also has to be combined with itself, involving
portions of matter from objects belonging to different granularity
levels. This results in portion of matter mixture aggregates that are
granular mixtures of object aggregates at levels of granularity
coarser than the level in which their constituting object entities can
be demarcated. For instance cell clusters embedded in ECM at
granularity levels coarser than the cellular level (Table 4). Because
the cells of a cell cluster are objects at the cellular level, they
constitute a portion of cellular substance at levels of granularity coarser
than the cellular level – at these coarser levels the individual cells
cannot be differentiated anymore [19]. Thus, at levels coarser than
the cellular level a cluster of cells embedded in ECM is a portion of
cellular substance that is clustered with a portion of ECM,
constituting a portion of tissue (c.f. [42]). As a consequence, a portion
of tissue is an aggregate mixture of two different types of portion of
matter entities, with the portion of matter entities forming object
aggregates at different levels of granularity.
A portion of tissue therefore is a subcategory of ‘portion of matter
mixture cluster’ (definition see Table S1). As a consequence, tissue
belongs to a different category than body liquids. They are
ontologically clearly distinct types of material entities (c.f. [43]).
The same holds for blood, which is composed of blood cells and
blood plasma. At the cellular level of granularity, a portion of
blood is a blood cell group with a portion of blood plasma cluster, but at
granularity levels coarser than the cellular level the blood cell
group is a portion of cellular substance.Aportion of blood, thus, is a
cluster of two different portions of matter (i.e. portion of blood cell
substance and portion of blood plasma). Lymph is another example for
an aggregate of two different portions of matter (i.e. portion of
lymphocytes substance and portion of lymph plasma). Since all these
aggregates are granular mixtures, tissue, blood and lymph belong
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[43]), but are clearly distinguished from body substances, such as
blood plasma, cytosol or ECM, that exclusively consist of material
entities of the same granularity level (c.f. structured and unstructured
stuff sensu [41]).
Discussion
An Integrated Taxonomy of Top-Level Categories of
Material Entity
The set of top-level categories of material entity suggested above
(see also additional definitions in Table S1) is more comprehensive
than the current set of BFO’s top-level categories and meets the
requirement of exhaustively covering all possible types of
cumulative-constitutively organized material entities. However,
the additional categories and the way they are organized make the
resulting top-level taxonomy complex (Fig. 9). Part of this
increased complexity reflects the complex reality we are dealing
with, part is owed to the particular taxonomic hierarchy employed
in this specific taxonomy.
When dealing with sufficiently complex real entities, there is
always more than one way of organizing their respective types
within an ontologically sound taxonomy of top-level categories.
When developing an ontology one is thus often faced with the
choice between two or more alternative ways of organizing the
respective categories within a taxonomic hierarchy that are equally
consistent and ontologically correct. At the end of the day, the
preference of one taxonomy of top-level categories over all other
possible alternatives to be implemented in a particular ontology is
a matter of design and thus rests on pragmatic rather than purely
ontological considerations. Therefore, it is legitimate to ask
whether it is possible to organize the top-level categories of
material entity in a simpler and clearer way that is easier to
manage and navigate and more suitable for ontology applications.
When discussing the pros and cons of alternative hierarchies,
one must keep in mind the specific function of a formal top-level
ontology. It must provide a top-level taxonomy for many different
domain reference ontologies and application ontologies. Different
domains have different demands on top-level categories, and so do
different application ontologies. Some of the here proposed
additional categories, as for instance ‘object with fiat object part
group with portion of matter cluster’ or ‘portion of matter mixture
group’, might not be relevant to science at all, because no real
correlate exists that is important to science, but have been included
for matters of completeness, whereas other categories, as for
instance ‘object with fiat object part cluster with portion of matter
cluster’ or ‘fiat object part cluster with portion of matter cluster
group’ will only be relevant to some ontologies. Other categories,
however, as for instance ‘object’, ‘fiat object part’ or ‘portion of
matter’, are relevant to almost all ontologies that are dealing with
biological material entities. Therefore, it is desirable to have a small
number of top-level categories that are direct sub-classes of
Figure 9. Taxonomy of Top-Level Categories of Constitutively
and Cumulative-Constitutively Organized Material Entities. A
taxonomy of top-level categories of material entity and important
subcategories that can be distinguished in constitutively and cumula-
tive-constitutively organized material entities. Black boxes indicate Basic
Formal Ontology (BFO) categories of material entity, dark grey boxes the
additional categories suggested by [4], white boxes additional categories
required for accommodating all cumulative-constitutively organized
material entities, and shaded grey boxes examples for specific subcate-
gories involving portions of matter as building blocks.
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0030004.g009
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entity. These foundational categories of material entity provide a
very general differentiation of basic types of material entity.
However, since most domain reference ontologies require a more
specific differentiation, a good foundational top-level ontology
provides a set of additional top-level categories that can be used as
needed by domain and application ontologies – again, with a
preferably small number of taxonomically more basic categories.
BFO currently (i.e. BFO Version 1.1) differentiates three
foundational categories of material entity: (i) ‘object’, (ii) ‘fiat
object part’, and (iii) ’object aggregate’ and does not specify any
additional categories. In [4] we have shown that this basic scheme
is not exhaustive and needs to be extended by two further
foundational categories (i.e. ‘fiat object part aggregate’ and ‘object
with fiat object part aggregate’). Moreover, we have argued that
BFO’s top-level categories of material entity are also not
differentiated enough to meet the requirements of many domain
reference ontologies, and therefore we suggested six additional
categories (i.e. differentiation of all aggregates of material entities
into clusters and groups; [4]). Above we argue that in order to
accommodate cumulative-constitutively organized material enti-
ties, further foundational and additional categories must be
included. All the categories we suggested in [4] and in the present
paper represent different top-level categories of material entity that
are not yet covered or differentiated by BFO.
However, the resulting complex taxonomy of ten foundational
and 25 additional categories of material entity can be significantly
simplified by introducing a new foundational category ‘material
entity aggregate’ with the direct subcategories ‘material entity
cluster’ and ‘material entity group’ (definition see Table S1), under
which all categories of material entity aggregates can be subsumed
– including BFO’s ‘object aggregate’.
Definition for ‘material entity aggregate’. A material entity
that is a mereological sum of separate material entities and possesses non-
connected boundaries.
Definition for ‘material entity cluster’. A material entity
aggregate that is a mereological sum of separate material entities, which adhere to
one another through chemical bonds or physical junctions that go beyond gravity.
Definition for ‘material entity group’. A material entity
aggregate that is a mereological sum of scattered (i.e. spatially separated)
material entities, which do not adhere to one another through chemical bonds or
physical junctions but, instead, relate to one another merely on grounds of metric
proximity. The material entities are separated from one another through space or
through other material entities that do not belong to the group.
Explanation. The introduction of these three additional
categories reduces the number of foundational categories to four:
(i) ‘object’, (ii) ‘fiat object part’, (iii) ‘portion of matter’, and (iv)
‘material entity aggregate’ (Fig. 10). As a consequence, all other
top-level categories would be subsumed under the two direct
subcategories of ‘material entity aggregate’. With the introduction
of ‘granular mixture cluster’ and ‘granular mixture group’, the
resulting taxonomy of material entity categories would be
organized into four levels. The top-level comprises the above-
mentioned four foundational categories, one of which entails all
aggregate entity categories. This latter foundational category
includes two direct subcategories, which differentiate between
clusters and spatially separated groups of material entity
aggregates. The third level comprises five top-level categories of
material entity aggregates in case of clusters and six in case of
groups, including ‘granular mixture cluster’ and ‘granular mixture
group’. As a consequence, all of the granular mixture aggregate
subcategories discussed above belong to the fourth level of the
hierarchy (Fig. 10; definitions see Table S1).
Compared to BFO’s current top-level categories of material
entity, this simplified taxonomy has four instead of three top-level
categories, two of which overlap with BFO (i.e. ‘object’, ‘fiat object
part’). Contrary to BFO, however, it manages to accommodate for
all types of constitutively as well as all types of cumulative-
constitutively organized material entities. Moreover, with the
suggestion of second and third level top-level categories, the
simplified taxonomy provides three levels of differentiation that
can be used by domain reference ontologies and application
oriented ontologies as they may need as top-level templates.
Conclusions
Further above we have argued that the notion of granular
representation is required in order to account for the trans-
granular multiple instantiations of cumulative-constitutively orga-
nized material entities. As a consequence, we suggested additional
categories for BFO. Now we can complete the transformation of
instance granularity trees to type granularity trees for cumulative-
constitutively organized material entities (Fig. 11) by specifying the
categories for extra-cellular molecules at levels coarser than the
molecular level and the categories for cells occurring outside from
organs at levels coarser than the cellular level of type granularity.
Obviously, and contrary to constitutively organized material
entities, the type granularity tree that results from the composi-
tional partitioning of a cumulative-constitutively organized
material entity is not restricted to object entities, but also includes
portions of matter and portion of matter aggregates (Fig. 7C left,
Fig. 11 right). The here proposed notion of granular representa-
tion thus allows to maintain the clear distinction of fixed levels of a
compositional granularity [19] also for a type granularity tree of
cumulative-constitutively organized material entities (contrary to
[39], who have explicitly rejected any notion of a fixed set of levels
of granularity) and still accommodate for the specificities of
biological material entities that result from their cumulative
constitutive granularity.
It has been acknowledge before that types of material entity
could be recognized ‘‘[…] that are not explicitly identified in the BFO
taxonomies or definitions that have been given […]’’ ([11], p. 70).
However, these types of material entity would ‘‘[…] lack salience and
are systematically irrelevant for a principled analysis of the ontology of scientific
domains […]’’ and are therefore ‘‘[…] intentionally not included in any
existing definition sets, taxonomies or implementations of BFO’’ ([11], p. 71).
Above we have shown that the current top-level categories of
material entity of BFO do not only fail to exhaustively cover all
types of scientifically relevant types of cumulative-constitutively
Figure 10. Integrated and Simplified Taxonomy of Top-Level Categories of Material Entity. A taxonomy of top-level categories of
material entity and important subcategories that can be distinguished in constitutively and cumulative-constitutively organized material entities. By
introducing the category ‘material entity aggregate’ one can reduce the number of foundational categories that exhaustively cover all possible types
of constitutively and cumulative-constitutively organized material entities to four. All other categories represent additional categories that are
organized into three hierarchical levels and subsumed under the foundational category ‘material entity aggregate’. All clusters of material entities are
subsumed under ‘material entity cluster’ and all groups under ‘material entity group’ respectively. Black boxes indicate Basic Formal Ontology (BFO)
categories of material entity, dark grey boxes the additional categories suggested by [4], and white boxes additional categories required for
accommodating all cumulative-constitutively organized material entities.
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0030004.g010
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developing domain ontologies that are consistent with the single
inheritance policy if these ontologies are supposed to cover also
scientifically relevant types of cumulative-constitutively organized
material entities. By extending BFO with the here proposed
additionaltop-level categoriesofmaterialentityandthosecategories
we proposed elsewhere [4], BFO will cover all types of material
entity, while still maintaining the single inheritance principle.
Moreover, with the here proposed notion of granular
representation and the additional categories of material entity
that involve portions of matter, formerly problematic types of
material entities are covered as well. We provide a clear and
ontologically consistent classification for body liquids (e.g. cytosol,
blood plasma), body substances (e.g. ECM, dentin) and granular
mixture portions (e.g. blood, tissue, lymph), which are otherwise
usually treated as special cases that could not be subsumed under
the current categories of BFO (Version 1.1).
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